Can China Be Tamed Through Economics?

Article in DRI Asia Review on 30July 2021: Can China Be Tamed Through Economics?

Despite all the talk of China-U.S. economic decoupling and premonition (and hyperventilation) about a new Cold War in the making, it is business as usual when it comes to trade between the two countries. On July 22, Bloomberg reported that despite Donald Trump’s tariffs designed to temper Chinese exports to the United States and reduce his country’s trade deficit with China, bilateral trade has bounced back to a new record. Noting this development, the news outlet wrote: “Eighteen months after the Trump administration signed the phase-one trade deal [in January 2020], the agreement has turned out to be a truce at best. The US trade deficit has not shrunk, most levies are still in place, and it has not led to negotiations over other economic issues.” Read the full article at https://thediplomat.com/ads/dri-asia-review/2021-07-30/index.html

From Macau, with Love: The Story of Chinese Aircraft Carrier

Dr R Srinivasan

Sun Tzu said, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle”.

Strategic discourses across the globe have focused on China on account of the unprecedented militarization that has happened in the South China Sea. China’s defiance of UNCLOS Arbitral Award to Philippines, building artificial islands in SCS and launching a series of military exercises close to Taiwan and Japan have been the theme of hundreds of strategic debates.

The Chinese actions in Galwan in June this year and the subsequent engagements and disengagements between India and China are also the themes of such discourses in India specially. India’s action to hasten the arrival of five Rafale fighter from France, DRDO successfully testing improved Varunastra (torpedo), a ministerial announcement that billions of USD would now are slated for upgrading defense equipment and such like news have been heartily discussed by experts almost to the point of hailing India’s might and will to address Chinese ambitions on India’s borders. It is to be recognized that such enthusiastic reading of the situation is good for national morale.

Experts agree that between equipment and morale, the latter is more important. There are a million battles in which this has been proved right too. However, experts also concede that morale is not a substitute for equipment. A poorly equipped army, however well motivated it may be, stands the risk humiliation in battle. Again, Sino-Indian conflict of 1961 provides ample lessons in this.

Taking the cue from Sun Tzu quoted above, we shall first see how China balances this factor.

The Taiwan Crisis of 1996

In 1996, Taiwan announced its first ever democratic elections for its President. The sitting president, Lee Teng-hui of the Kuomintang party was voted to office in those elections. When the announcement for elections were made in 1995, as expected China protested and even mobilized its Second Artillery Corps (now designated as PLA Rocket Forces) and re-deployed its F-7 (MiG 21 Fishbed variant) fleet some 250 miles from Taiwan. Reportedly, hundreds of Chinese civilian fishing boats entered Taiwanese waters too. Chinese continued missile ‘testing’ and firing live missiles as part of the exercise even after March 1996 elections were over (Mizokami, 2019). With tensions rising, especially when two missiles fell within thirty five mile radius of Taipei, the beleaguered Taiwan turned to its staunchest ally, USA, fearing imminent invasion by PLA.

US responded quickly. Japan based carrier fleet led by USS Independence took position on the East of Taiwan. A bigger carrier group headed by USS Nimitz rushed from the Persian Gulf and took its position in Philippine Sea (Global Security, 2011). With two US Carrier Groups now flanking Taiwan, China called off its military exercises. A credible threat of invasion was averted.

While there were sighs of relief in Taiwan, US and its allies, China learnt a crucial lesson – the importance of aircraft carriers!

The PLAN as on that day had no carrier task force and its shore based missile corps or tin-pot naval ships were no match for the armada headed by Independence and Nimitz. It may not be out of place to say that historical memories of British-European battleships raining hellfire on Canton in 1839 may have flashed across the Chinese mind.

So what did the Chinese do?

In 1991 when USSR broke into 16 countries of Central Asia, Ukraine came in possession of   Kuznetsov-class aircraft cruiser Riga which had been commissioned in 1988. Cash strapped Ukraine put the ship up for sale to Russia, India and China. In view of the diplomatic situation in the world in the aftermath of the collapse of USSR, China declined. India did not take interest and Russia was financially weak. So the fully constructed carrier, short of electronics and few other needs, was left to rust. In 1998 however, the rusting hulk was bought at auction for $20 million a Mr. Chong Lot for his company based in Macau. Chong Lot proposed that the ship would be converted into a $200 million floating hotel and casino (ARKIB, 1998).

In a story that could become an international bestselling thriller, Riga commenced its journey in June 2000 and tugged around the Cape of Good Hope, reached Chinese waters in February 2002, a journey of 28200 km at a speed of 6 knots!! In 2012, after refits and modernization, now christened Liaoning, the aircraft carrier entered service with PLAN in September.

The entire exercise of obtaining its aircraft carrier was done out in the typical Chinese way – bluff, divert and deny. For example, when reports started appearing in the news, the Chinese Navy official who mastered minded the operation went ‘missing’. Later it was reported that he was imprisoned for smuggling. In 2012, when reports of the carrier refit appeared, Chinese admitted candidly to refitting the ship for ‘scientific and explorative purposes’. The consummate skill with Chinese media puts out or denies information and misinformation makes it hard to discern the truths surrounding anything. Of course, what stands out undeniably is that China has its own aircraft carrier the Liaoning. The second Liaoning class carrier, Shandong, was commissioned by the PLA Navy on December 17, 2019, in Sanya, South China's Hainan Province. What is important to note is the speed with which Shandong came into service, unlike Liaoning. Construction started in November 2013 and in December 2019, she was commissioned into PLAN (China Power Team, 2020).

What do we learn?

Baku was built in 1987 and remained in Russian navy as a Gorshkov Class carrier till 1996. It was de-activated due to financial crisis in Russia. India’s interest in the carrier began then. Eight years of negotiations later, India and Russia signed a deal for its purchase. It took nine more years before she entered service, now re-christened as INS Vikramaditya. Any diversion into the politico-bureaucratic delays and scandals that have racked defense procurement in India will take us away from what Sun Tzu taught us to do: “If you know the enemy and know yourself…”. So let us just look at the lessons that come out of the thriller like Chinese story that we may title in James Bond style – From Macau, with Love!

Lesson 1:

With two US carrier groups standing at its doorstep, especially of the Nimitz class, use of the entire Second Artillery Corps and fleet of J-7s would have only repeated what happened at Canton. President Xi Jinping specifically called it the Century of Humiliation. Adventurism tempered with wisdom. So, lesson number one is: Learn from your history.

Lesson 2:

It took Chinese ten years to refit and induct Riga as their own Liaoning. The point to note is it the rusting old float that was towed 28000 km came became China’s credible aircraft carrier through their own technical, home grown expertise at the port of Dalian (Vavasseur, 2019). Lesson number two: Grow your technical expertise to cater to FUTURE needs.

Lesson 3:

Liaoning even went through a refit after six years of service bringing new lessons. The third aircraft carrier the China is developing now reportedly will come with CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off but Arrested Recovery) design equipped with electromagnetic catapults). Lesson number three: Learn again from your weapon system and involve R&D in improvising them.

Interestingly, India’s story of procuring INS Vikramaditya runs on a similar dateline to Liaoning. Rest is open to deductions.   

Lesson 4:

The second carrier, Shandong, was launched in less than six years from the scratch. An ability to assimilate and focus research to produce what the country needs. Lesson number four: Remain focused and constantly upgrade skills.

Lesson 5:

The political scenario in China through late 1990’s to 2012 went through as many incidents and events as could draw parallel from India. Just to mention few events: in 1996, China launches Shanghai Five that became SCO later; in 1997, death of Deng Xiaoping witnesses riots, bombings and killings; in 1998, Zhu Rongji launches reforms, creating economic turmoil in and outside Party lines; in 1999, NATO bombs Chinese Embassy in Belgrade; in 2000, the purging of corrupt officials starts; in 2003+ SARS hits China and the Hong Kong rebellion breaks out; in 2005, China adopts new law that calls for  Taiwan calls for use of force should Taipei declare independence from mainland China; 2005-06 witness rising tensions with Japan; in 2007-08, new Bishop chosen by China is approved by the Pope in Rome and the worst ever snow storms kill over a 100 million people; 2008-09 mark the global financial crisis impacting China too; 2010-12, notwithstanding allegation of Chinese cyber hacks and resultant with US, it emerges as the world’s no.2 economy; in 2012. The Bo Xilai scandal rocks China… (BBC, 2019)

Lesson number five, and most important of all: Internal or even externally assisted turmoil come and pass over. As they say-Even This Shall Pass. The country’s political, bureaucratic mechanism must be proofed against such vagaries of the times.

Conclusion

The lessons that we have attempted to draw from China’s aircraft carrier acquisition may appear too big for the type of events we have taken to introspect into. We do feel that way when we write about this. But then, we are chastened by our own Tiruvalluvar who says:

எற்றுஎன்று இரங்குவ செய்யற்க செய்வானேல்

மற்றுஅன்ன செய்யாமை நன்று

“A person shall not undertake in the first place, any act which might force him to regret later. If, by chance, he had done, such an act by mistake due to ignorance or unavoidable circumstances, let him not repeat it”

Manu, the giver of law that even today forms the basis of Indian Civil law, also said the same:

अज्ञानाद् यदि वा ज्ञानात् कृत्वा कर्म विगर्हितम् ।
तस्माद् विमुक्तिमन्विच्छन् द्वितीयं न समाचरेत् ॥

“He who, having either unintentionally or intentionally committed a regrettable deed, desires to be freed from the guilt on it, must not commit it a second time” (Sanskrit Roots, n.d).

We generally take these philosophers as having dealt with man’s quest of realization with. However, these lessons apply equally in all the spheres of life of a society too.

Even Sun Tzu never wrote his treatise keeping only Generals and Commanders in mind!!    

Acknowledgment

This article was first published by te author in Defence Research and Studies website  https://dras.in/chinese-aircraft-carrier-from-macau-with-love/ on 28 December 2020.

References

ARKIB. (1998, November 11). Utusan Online. Retrieved December 04, 2020, from Macau Company Denies Buying Carrier For China: https://web.archive.org/web/20170224132150/http://ww1.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=1998&dt=1111&pub=Utusan_Express&sec=World_Trend&pg=wt_09.htm

BBC. (2019, July 29). BBC. Retrieved November 15, 2020, from China profile - Timeline: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13017882

China Power Team. (2020, August 26). CSIS. Retrieved December 04, 2020, from What Do We Know (so far) about China’s Second Aircraft Carrier?: https://chinapower.csis.org/china-aircraft-carrier-type-001a/

Global Security. (2011, July 05). Global Security. Retrieved December 04, 2020, from Taiwan Strait: 21 July 1995 to 23 March 1996: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/taiwan_strait.htm

Mizokami, K. (2019, November 20). National Interest. Retrieved December 04, 2020, from The 1996 Taiwan Crisis Shows Why China Wants Aircraft Carriers so Badly: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/1996-taiwan-crisis-shows-why-china-wants-aircraft-carriers-so-badly-98152

Sanskrit Roots. (n.d). Sanskrit Roots. Retrieved October 18, 2020, from National Integration Through Thirukkural And Sanskrit: https://sanskritroots.com/thirukkural-couplets/601-700/651-660/655-introspection/

Vavasseur, X. (2019, January 24). Naval News. Retrieved December 04, 2020, from Liaoning Aircraft Carrier Returns To Sea After Refit: https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/01/liaoning-aircraft-carrier-returns-to-sea-after-refit/

Dec 2020-Jan 2021 Issue of EJSSS

We are happy to announce that the Dec 2020-Jan 2021 Issue of Electronic Journal of Social and Strategic Studies (EJSSS) with 06 papers on IR, Strategic Studies, Psychology and Edn & Trg, and 03 Book Reviews on IR/Education is online. We are an Open Access, refereed journal committed to promote interdisciplinary research in Social Sciences/Strategic Studies. We are also a member journal of CROSSREF. Our application for ISSN is in process.

Visit us at www.ejsss.net.in

We specifically aspire to encourage young and emerging scholars to publish their research and publication. We firmly believe that a knowledge driven society is the only hope for a promising and sustainable future that all of us hope for.
The contents of our Issue are as below:

CONTENTS

 

Articles

 

1. China and the West: Contestations in African Development and Security                       122-150

    Dr Napoleon Kurantin and Prof. Bertha Z. Osei-Hwedie

    https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2020.1201

 

2. Criminal Justice Responses and Fear of Crime in the Era of COVID-19                        151-166

    Chyna N. Crawford, PhD

    https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2020.1202

 

3. Multilateralism, Multipolarity and ASEAN: A Re-Appraisal                                             167-186

    Prof. Y Yagama Reddy

    https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2020.1203

 

4. Procedure Established by Law, Right to Privacy                                                              187-214

    and Investigative Powers of State: An Appraisal

    Dr Rajamanickam Srinivasan

    https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2020.1204

 

5. US and India: Paving the road to ensuring peace and prosperity                                   215-237

    in the Indo-Pacific region                                                                                                 

    Udita Banerjee

    https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2020.1205

 

6. South China Sea: Perspectives, Challenges and India’s Options                                     238-263

    Commodore SL Deshmukh, NM (Retd)

    https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2020.1206

 

Book Reviews

 

7. Digital Media and the Politics of Transformation in the Arab World and Asia              264-265

    by Carola Richter et. al. (2018)

    Dr Cserkits Michael

    https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2020.1207

 

8. The Science of Agriculture: A Biological Approach (5th Ed.)                                         266-268

    by Dr. Ray V. Herren

    Dr. Wandra Arrington

    https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2020.1208

 

9. Just Research in Contentious Times: Widening the Methodological Imagination          269-272

    by Michelle Fine

    Katherine Baker Johnson

    https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2020.1209

Pawns in a Board Game: Prisoners of War

 Dr R Srinivasan

 

India returns Chinese soldier

On 18 October 2020, Corporal Wang Ya Long of the Chinese PLA strayed across the LAC in Demchok sector and was apprehended by Indian Army. Army sources confirmed the apprehension and also issued a statement that he would be released after completing specified formalities[i]. Forty eight hours later, Corporal Wang Ya Long was handed over to PLA front line troops at Chushul-Moldo meeting point, which was corroborated by Chinese media in their press releases[ii].

Though the above incident did not cause any stir in public minds, not to say scholarly discussions, it is an important of dimension to be looked at in the light of Sino-Indian skirmish at Galwan in May this year. The board game of chess that commenced at that time remains in spotlight what with both the countries moving their pawns in manners that are testing each other’s will.

India and China are both signatories to the Geneva Conventions 1949. While India ratified the Conventions in 1950, China ratified them in 1956[iii]. Under Article 118, first paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention III (GC III): “Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.” Being signatories to the Convention, both India and China have an International legal obligation to repatriate PsOW, should and whenever conflicts between the countries occur. Interestingly, GC III applies only in conflicts that are declared as war.

Technically speaking, a soldier in uniform (with or without weapons) straying into another country is deemed as a mercenary and is liable for criminal prosecution in the country where he is apprehended. Should that person be not in uniform, he is deemed as a spy and is likely to be prosecuted accordingly. Both these conditions could apply in situations where armed conflicts not declared as war by respective countries prevail. ICRC and the larger international community of scholars have always advocated fair treatment and return of soldiers even under these circumstances, though such opinions are at best looked upon as humanitarian appeals rather than mandates of GC III.

China and Indian PsOW

Immediately after the 1962 Sino-Indian operations, the Indian Red Cross handed over a list of 3968 names of Indian soldiers as having been would, killed or captured to the Chinese Red Cross. China refuted the claims and delayed its responses till 1963. After an intensive diplomatic and international intervention, courtesy Rajkumari Amrit Kaur and Maj Gen CK Lakshmanan, China accepted that it held 1132 POW and had returned 715 wounded earlier with 13 dead bodies. On January 25, 1963, the ICRC's executive director wrote to General Lakshmanan to draw the IRC's attention to the announcements of the China News Agency that 2,156, (or 3,350) Indian POWs were still in Chinese hands.

On 6^th February 1963, President ICRC himself took up the matter with Marshal Chen Yi, the then Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs. Marshal Chen intimated ICRC two weeks later that “Since the Sino-Indian border clashes, the Chinese government has all along given good treatment in every respect to the Indian military personnel who were captured in the course of their attacks on the Chinese frontier guards.”[iv] China maintained that it was Indian troops that had attacked ‘unsuspecting’ border guards of the Chinese Army in Tibet and Sinkiang!!

Importantly, as Claude Arpi noted in his report, China found it “most regrettable that the India PoWs 'captured in the course of the Chinese frontier guards's counterattacks in self-defence' were equated with the 'law-abiding overseas Chinese illegally detained by the Indian authorities.' On 27^th February 1963, the ICRC confirmed to General Lakshmanan that the total number of Indian prisoners of war still in Chinese hands was 3,319, excluding the 716 wounded and sick who have been repatriated and the 13 bodies returned by the Chinese Red Cross.” [v] From 1963 onwards, China announced that it will release PsOW in batches. As of now, there does not appear to be any clear document or report by either governments whether all PsOW have been repatriated. Such an action by Chinese took nearly eighteen months after considerable international pressure.

India and PsOW

India’s actions to repatriate 93000 Pakistani soldiers who surrendered at Dacca after 1971 Indo-Pak war stands testimony to the commitment to International Law and Humanitarian Principles that India stands by. Repatriating Wang Ya Long now reiterates India’s position on such issues.

In contrast, during 1962, the Chinese had even pointed out that there was no ‘Declaration of War’ between India and China. They used this line of international legal logic to deny ICRC the right to visit China and inspect their internment facilities. Initiatives taken by President ICRC, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur as President of Indian Red Cross and Maj Gen Lakshmanan eventually melted down their cold denial.

Conclusion

Clauswitz famously said, “War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means”[vi]. While the common perception is politics sans morality, war is not fought on barbaric terms. The soldiers partaking in war are merely executing the will of the polity. They have neither personal enmity nor do they entertain culturally induced hatred. Therefore, a polity when it chooses to defy international norms such as laid down in Geneva Conventions, indulges in acts that humanity has always held as abhorrent.

India’s action to return Wang stands as a testimony to the nation’s vibrant culture that upholds non-violence and forgiveness as core principles even in international relations where geopolitical compulsions give rise to temptations and vanity resulting in irresponsible acts by political actors.

Acknowledgement: This article was earlier published by the author on Defence Research and Studies website at https://dras.in/pawns-in-a-board-game-prisoners-of-war/ on 24 Oct 2020.

---

[i] Spl Corr. (2020, October 19). Army apprehends Chinese soldier in Demchok sector—The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/army-apprehends-chinese-soldier-in-demchok-sector/article32892047.ece

[ii] Krishnan, A., & Peri, D. (2020, October 21). India hands over Chinese soldier who crossed LAC. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-hands-over-chinese-soldier-who-crossed-lac/article32906023.ece

[iii] ICRC. (n.d.). Treaties, States parties, and Commentaries—China. Retrieved October 21, 2020, from https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=CN

[iv] Arpi, C. (2019, December 6). Exclusive! How China released Indian troops after the 1962 War—Rediff.com India News. https://www.rediff.com/news/special/how-china-released-indian-troops-after-the-1962-war/20191206.htm

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Clausewitz: War as Politics by other Means—Online Library of Liberty. (n.d.). Retrieved October 21, 2020, from https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/clausewitz-war-as-politics-by-other-means

 

Inaugural Issue EJSSS

We are happy to announce to announce that the 1st Issue of Electronic Journal of Social and Strategic Studies (EJSSS) with 06 papers on IR, Strategic Studies, History and Edn & Trg, one research opinion on Security  Studies and 02 Book Reviews on IR is online. EJSSS is an OA Journal committed to promote interdisciplinary research in Social Sciences/Strategic Studies. We are a member journal of CROSSREF. 

Visit us at www.ejsss.net.in

EJSSS specifically hopes to encourage young and emerging scholars to undertake interdisciplinary research and publication. We firmly believe that a knowledge driven society is the only hope for a promising and sustainable future that all of us aspire for.

The contents of our First Issue are as below:

 CONTENTS

 Articles

 1. Security-Development Nexus - China’s Policy Framework towards Africa  by 

    Dr Bertha Z. Osei-Hwedie and Napoleon Kurantin

 2. Reminiscing an African Connect: The Impregnable Janjira                                 

    Dr CS Anuradha 

 3. Bangladesh Playing Chinese checkers with India                                                    

    Group Captain AV Chandrasekaran (Retd)

 4. Covid-19 Lockdown: An Opportunity to Explore New Frontiers for                         

    Online-Training

    Dr DK Pandey

 5. India-ASEAN Cooperation in the Evolving Regional Mechanisms                             

    Dr M Prayaga

 6. Implications of Multitudinous Multilateral Institutions for Southeast Asia               

    Prof. Y. Yagama Reddy

 

Perspective/Commentary

 

7. Paradigm shift in Coastal Security in India                                                               

    Commodore RS Vasan IN (Retd)

 

Book Reviews

 

8. Rise of the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives, Dimensions and Challenges                               

    by Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra (Ed.)

    Farhat Jahan

 9. International Relations Today: Concepts and Applications                                            

    by Prof. Aneek Chatterjee 

    Masom Jan Masomy